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NOTES
THE SUPREME COURT UNDER
PRESSURE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF UNITED STATES V. NIXON AND
NIXON V. FITZGERALD
In 1974, Richard M. Nixon became the first President of the
United States to lose a case in which he was a party before the
Supreme Court.' The Court, in United States v. Nixon,2 unani-
mously ordered Nixon's compliance with a subpoena calling for the
production of the Watergate tapes.3 Eight years later, Nixon reap-
peared as a litigant before the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Fitzger-
ald.4 The outcome of this 1982 case, however, was considerably dif-
' Schwartz, Bad Presidents Make Hard Law: Richard M. Nixon in the Supreme Court,
31 RUTGERS L. REV. 22, 22 (1977).
2 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Id. at 686; see infra notes 54-61.
4 102 S.Ct. 2690 (1982). In addition to United States v. Nixon and Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
Nixon appeared as a litigant before the Court in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
435 U.S. 589 (1978), and Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). In
General Services, Nixon challenged the validity of the Presidential Recording and Materials
Preservation Act (the Act), 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1976), which vested custody of Nixon's presi-
dential papers and tapes in the Administrator of General Services and directed him to pro-
vide specific guidelines for future access to these materials. See 433 U.S. at 429. The Court
upheld the validity of the Act against challenges to its constitutionality. Id. at 484. A con-
siderable amount of criticism of the General Services decision, see, e.g., Schwartz, supra
note 1, at 33-38; Recent Cases, Constitutional Law, Nixon v. Administrator of General Ser-
vices, 47 S.Ct. 2777 (1977), 11 AKRON L. REV. 373, 385-86 (1977), has centered upon the
Court's determination that although "the Act impose[d] burdensome consequences" on
Nixon, and he was specifically named in the legislation, it was not violative of the bill of
attainder clause of the Constitution. 433 U.S. at 472-73. It has been suggested that the
decision was "influenced more by the need to ensure that Nixon would not secure custody of
his presidential materials than by settled law on the subject." Schwartz, supra note 1, at 35.
In 1978, the Watergate tapes were again at issue in Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978), in which Warner Communications and the three major television
networks, among others, sought the right to copy tapes admitted into evidence in the trial of
John Mitchell. Id. at 591. The Court refused that request, basing its decision on the Presi-
dential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act. Id. at 603-07. The Court noted that
through this Act, Congress had already prescribed the procedure for public access to the
tapes, id. at 603, such procedural limitations overriding Warner's claim of a common-law
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ferent than that of the 1974 decision. Although the constitutional
issues were similar," the 1982 Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Nixon, recognizing an absolute presidential immunity from liabil-
ity for damages stemming from official acts.7
Concomitant with the disparity in the two Supreme Court de-
cisions is a sharp contrast in Nixon's public image. Although
Nixon's public esteem was at its nadir in 1974, public sentiment in
1982 was sympathetic, sometimes quite positive, toward the former
President." It appears that this later climate was more conducive
to a well-reasoned and deliberative disposition of the issue
presented. It is indeed submitted that the Court's disposition of
the civil immunity question in Fitzgerald lends credence to the ar-
guments criticizing the 1974 decision as one of compromise. Hence,
given similarities between the issues in Nixon and Fitzgerald, the
reappearance of Nixon as litigant, and the lack of observable exter-
nal pressure on the Fitzgerald Court, an evaluation of the impact
of United States v. Nixon seems timely.
At the outset, this Note will examine public opinion of Rich-
ard Nixon throughout the Watergate crisis and analyze the opinion
of the Court in United States v. Nixon. After contrasting the ra-
tionale employed by the Court in United States v. Nixon with that
of the 1982 Fitzgerald opinion, it will become evident that in 1974
the Court sacrificed clarity and reasoning in favor of unanimity.
Finally, the Note will illustrate the consequences of this concern
for unanimity through an examination of the United States v.
Nixon precedent as it has been interpreted by the state courts.
RICHARD NIXON AND PUBLIC OPINION
In January of 1973, public opinion of Richard Nixon was at its
highest point in, his administration.9 By November of that year,
right of access to judicial records, id. at 607-08.
5 Compare Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. at 2701 (Court held in favor of Nixon's claim
of immunity) with United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713 (Court held unanimously against
Nixon's claim of privilege).
6 See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
7 See 102 S. Ct. at 2701.
8 See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
* 108 THE GALLUP OPINION INDEX-POLIICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS, June 1974,
at 1, 5 [hereinafter cited as GALLUP]. The Gallup poll indicates that in January, 1973, 68%
of the American people surveyed approved of Richard Nixon's performance as President. Id.
This was the highest approval rating Nixon received during his two terms in office. 111 id.,
Sept. 1974, at 10. Gallup polls are utilized throughout this Note because they have proven to
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however, as the debacle of Watergate began to unfold, 10 Nixon's
popularity dwindled to a point that was one of the lowest of any
American president.11
Watergate, "the biggest political scandal in the history of the
United States, ' 12 began with the early morning arrest of five men
at the Watergate hotel complex in Washington, D.C. on June 17,
1972.13 The incident, including the arrest of two men close to the
Nixon Reelection Committee, 4 had no immediate impact on
Nixon's popularity; 15 he won the 1972 Presidential election by a
landslide.1 ' The potential for far-reaching consequences mani-
fested itself, however, when a Senate committee was formed to in-
vestigate the matter 17 and an inquiry by the Justice Department
was initiated.18 By early May of 1973, Nixon's approval ratings, as
be a highly accurate indicator of presidential popularity. See 199 id., Apr. 1982, at 49 (show-
ing accuracy of Gallup predictions in presidential elections). The procedure utilized in com-
piling the poll is designed to produce samples that are representative of the United States
civilian adult population. The results of the polls are based upon interviews conducted with
a minimum of 1,500 adults. Id. at 2 (note to reader).
1o See infra notes 12-44 and accompanying text.
11 See 111 GALLUP, supra note 9, Sept. 1974, at 4, 10. The lowest Gallup approval rating
was 23% for Harry Truman in 1951; Nixon's lowest level was 24%. Id.
12 NEW YORK TIMES, THE END OF A PRESIDENCY 36 (1974).
" 1 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., WATERGATE: CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS 3 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as 1 CHRONOLOGY]. According to assertions made by Democratic National
Committee Chairman Lawrence F. O'Brien, telephones at the Committee's headquarters
had been tapped for several weeks prior to the break-in. Id. at 4. Additionally, a break-in
was attempted at McGovern Headquarters on Capitol Hill on May 27, 1972. The men alleg-
edly were thwarted by the presence of campaign workers. Id. The five men arrested on June
17, 1972 included Bernard L. Barker, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee,
Frank A. Sturgis, an associate of Barker with ties to the CIA, and James W. McCord, Jr.,
security coordinator for both the Republican National Committee and the Committee for
the Reelection of the President. Id. Barker reportedly had ties with Nixon as well. Id. at 5.
1 Id. at 9-11. G. Gordon Liddy and James W. McCord, Jr. were convicted in the after-
math of the Watergate burglary. Id. at 11. Although Liddy was not arrested at the time of
the break-in, the grand jury that indicted the five men arrested also indicted Liddy and E.
Howard Hunt, Jr., a former White House consultant. Id. at 9. At the time of the indict-
ments, Liddy was counsel to the Finance Committee to Reelect the President. Id. at 4. Dur-
ing the opening days of the trial all of the defendants except Liddy and McCord pleaded
guilty to all of the charges. Id. at 10.
1 See id. at 23. In the latter part of 1972, Watergate was not a particularly salient issue
to the American public. Id. Fifty-two percent of those surveyed by Gallup in October 1972
indicated that they had heard or read about Watergate. See id. Although reports of miscon-
duct appeared in the news media as early as the fall of 1972, id. at 8, the Watergate issue
was not addressed by the Gallup poll in terms of Nixon's popularity until May of 1973. See
95 GALLUP, supra note 9, May 1973, at 1-11.
16 89 GALLUP, supra note 9, Nov. 1972, at 1.
'7 See 1 CHRONOLOGY, supra note 13, at 46.
18 Id. at 11.
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measured by a Gallup poll, had plummetted from a high of sixty-
eight percent in January to forty-five percent.19 This drop and the
corresponding rise in the saliency of the Watergate issue in the
minds of the American public" apparently was influenced by the
resignation of two of Nixon's closest aides and the Attorney Gen-
eral.21 While anti-Nixon sentiment at this time continued to grow,
Americans still displayed a desire to settle the issues rather than to
remove Nixon from office.22
By mid-May, the Senate was conducting open hearings as part
of its Watergate investigation,23 and the office of the Watergate
Special Prosecutor was formally established.2 4 Testimony at the
Senate hearings led to the issuance of congressional and grand jury
subpoenas. 5 When it became clear that Nixon would not comply
voluntarily with the subpoenas,26 both the Senate and the grand
jury sought judicial enforcement.27 In October of 1973, the Special
"1 95 GALLUP, supra note 9, May 1973, at 2.
1o See id. at 1, 5. While in September 1972 only 52% of the American people had heard
or read about Watergate, this figure rose to 98% by June 1973. 111 GALLUP, supra note 9,
Sept. 1974, at 7.
21 1 CHRONOLOGY, supra note 13, at 56. John Ehrlichman was the Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Domestic Affairs, while H.R. Haldeman held the position of Nixon's Chief of Staff.
Id. at 42. They had been described as "the two most powerful men in the White House after
Nixon himself." Id. at 56. John Mitchell was the United States Attorney General.
22 See id. at 50. While Nixon's Gallup approval rating was only 48% in April 1973, a
Harris survey indicated that a mere 13% of the American public thought that Nixon should
resign from office. Id.
23 Id. at 63. The Senate committee was formed in order "to investigate . . . 'illegal,
improper or unethical activities'" connected with the presidential campaign of 1972 and to
consider whether new legislation was needed to "'safeguard the electoral process . . .'
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 53
(D.D.C. 1973).
24 1 CHRONOLOGY, supra note 13, at 63.
16 2 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., WATERGATE: CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS 337 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as 2 CHRONOLOGY]. At Senate hearings held on July 16, 1973, Alexander P.
Butterfield, head of the Federal Aviation Administration and a former White House aide,
made public the fact that presidential conversations had been recorded since 1971. Id.
" See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp.
51, 54 (D.D.C. 1973). Nixon responded to the Senate subpoenas by sending a letter to the
chairman of the Committee asserting his intention not to comply with the subpoenas. Id.
According to Nixon's press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, Nixon felt it would be "'constitution-
ally inappropriate' and a violation of the separation of powers" to obey the Senate's order. 1
CHRONOLOGY, supra note 13, at 103.
27 See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp.
521 (D.D.C.), afl'd, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 360 F. Supp.
1 (D.D.C.), modified per curiam sub noma. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en
banc). Prior to disposition of the suits brought by the Senate Select Committee, the district
court had refused to address the merits of the claim of the Committee for lack of jurisdic-
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Prosecutor, in Nixon v. Sirica,25 obtained a favorable judgment in
an action brought for enforcement of a subpoena requesting the
White House tapes.2 9 Foregoing his right to appeal, the President
instead embarked upon a course of action that would be met with
vehement public outcry.
On Friday, October 19, rather than obey the order of the cir-
cuit court in Nixon v. Sirica,30 Nixon proposed a plan whereby he
would submit prepared transcripts of the tapes to the grand jury."
tion. See 366 F. Supp. at 61. The Senate subsequently passed legislation granting the court
special jurisdiction to hear the case. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521, 522 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The fact that the Senate sought judicial enforcement is unusual since there are other
available means of exacting compliance with a congressional summons. See Senate Select
Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 54 (D.D.C. 1973). A
witness who refuses to testify or produce papers when summoned by either House of Con-
gress may be subject to a contempt proceeding. Id. Currently, refusal to comply with a con-
gressional summons constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and
imprisonment for a maximum of 12 months. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1976). In addition, Congress has
long possessed the right to compel compliance with a summons by arresting the recalcitrant
party. See Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 599 (1929). These
methods, however, were not employed against then-President Nixon, since it was argued
that such methods would be "inappropriate and unseemly." 366 F. Supp. at 54. Comment-
ing upon the Senate's actions in seeking judicial enforcement of the summons, Judge Wilkey
wrote:
Nothing so illustrates the extent to which heat may have replaced light in the
appraisal of this entire Watergate affair than the fact that the United States Sen-
ate has reversed the strategy of 184 years, and put the question of its right to
obtain papers from the Executive into the hands of the Judiciary to determine.
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 778 n.74 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
The efforts of the Senate Committee to obtain judicial enforcement were unsuccessful.
See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521,
523 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The district court in Senate Select Com-
mittee noted that three grand juries were engaged in separate investigations of the Water-
gate affair, and that the first criminal trial was scheduled to begin on April 1, 1974. 370 F.
Supp. at 523. In ruling that the Senate Committee's subpoena should not be enforced by the
court, the district court agreed with the opinion of the Watergate Special Prosecutor, Archi-
bald Cox, who had been urging the Senate Committee to suspend public hearings since June
1973. 1 CHRONOLOGY, supra note 13, at 111. Cox was quoted as saying that "public hearings
prior to the investigation will increase the risk that major guilty parties will go unpunished
." Id.
28 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (en banc).
29 Id. at 722.
30 See id.
31 2 CHRONOLOGY, supra note 25, at 70. In addition to the submission of prepared tran-
scripts of the tapes to the grand jury, Nixon offered to allow Senator John C. Stennis, a
Democrat from Mississippi, to listen to the tapes and verify the transcripts. Id. Senator
Stennis has been described as "a respected but exceedingly conservative Southerner sympa-
thetic to executive power and secrecy." A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPRME COURT IN Amu=-
CAN GOVERNMENT 7 (1976).
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Additionally, Nixon ordered the special prosecutor, Archibald Cox,
to cease all further attempts to obtain evidentiary material directly
from the President.32 Faced with what was essentially noncompli-
ance with an order of the court, the special prosecutor brought his
case to the public. In a televised news conference, he announced
his intention to seek full enforcement of the court's order.33 That
night, Nixon ordered the firing of Cox from the office of Watergate
special prosecutor during what came to be known as the "Saturday
Night Massacre. 3 4 Public response to these events has been re-
ferred to as a "firestorm, '35 and it was seriously doubted whether
Nixon would survive the widespread attack. 6
The White House attempted to regain the public trust
through "Operation Candor,' '37 which included a press conference
and several meetings, both public and private, with political lead-
32 2 CHRONOLOGY, supra note 25, at 85-86.
33 Id. at 70. On October 20, 1973, Cox made a public television appearance because he
felt it was necessary to put the question of the President's obligation to obey the court
before the public, in light of the absence of a judicial enforcement mechanism. A. Cox,
supra note 31, at 7-8.
34 L. JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER, THE PROSECUTION OF WATERGATE 2 (1976);
see E. DREW, WASHINGTON JOURNAL 51-53 (1974). Nixon directed his Attorney General, El-
liot Richardson, to fire Cox. Richardson, noting the fact that he had pledged to maintain the
independence of the investigation, chose to resign rather than carry out the President's or-
der. 2 CHRONOLOGY, supra note 25, at 87-88. Next in line was Deputy Attorney General
William Ruckelshaus. Stating that his conscience would not permit him to fire Cox, he too
resigned. Id. at 88. Eventually, the firing of Cox was accomplished by Solicitor General Rob-
ert Bork. Id.
35 2 CHRONOLOGY, supra note 25, at 70. It was Alexander M. Haig, Jr. who first analo-
gized public reaction to the termination of Cox to a "firestorm." Id. This "firestorm" has
been described as "the most devastating assault that any American President has endured
in a century .... ." 82 NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 1973, at 20. Among those groups calling for
Nixon's impeachment or resignation were the legal profession, the clergy, and leaders in
Nixon's own political party. Id. This outpouring of public opinion was met by the introduc-
tion of impeachment-related legislation by an overwhelming number of congressmen. See 2
CHRONOLOGY, supra note 25, at 69. In addition to calls for impeachment, it was urged that a
special prosecutor's office be established. Id. According to a poll conducted by the National
Broadcasting Company television network, Nixon's popularity dropped to 22%. 82 NEws-
WEEK, supra, at 22. It was even speculated that Nixon's focus on military matters during
this period was part of a scheme to shift the Watergate issue from public attention. E.
DREW, supra note 34, at 70-74. The firing of Cox caused Nixon's popularity ratings, as mea-
sured by the Gallup poll, to drop below 30% for the first time during his administration; his
ratings never again surpassed this level. See 111 GALLUP, supra note 9, Sept. 1974, at 7.
Despite the public reaction, it has been stated that the firing of Cox was simply a legal
exercise of the power of the Executive to decide on prosecution matters. See Miller, The
Presidency and Separation of Powers, 60 A.B.A. J. 195, 195 (1974).
1C 82 NEWSWEEK, supra note 35, at 20.
37 2 CHRONOLOGY, supra note 25, at 148.
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ers.3 8 It was before a nationally televised meeting of the Associated
Press Managing Editors that Nixon declared that he was "not a
crook." '3 Moreover, his answers to questions concerning highly
sensitive issues4° reflected an apparent desire on Nixon's part to
reveal the true facts pertaining to the Watergate affair.41 The press
conference also enabled the President to stress his foreign policy
achievements. 42 Despite these efforts, the effect of Operation Can-
dor on the public opinion polls was minimal, Nixon's approval rat-
38 Id.
39 Id. The President's remark was in response to a question relating to his personal
finances. Id.
10 Id. The President entertained questions from the press, including inquiries involving
the public's perception of his credibility, the Ellsberg break-in, and questionable positions
taken on his personal income tax returns. Id. The Ellsberg incident occurred at the height of
the nationwide protest against the Vietnam War, when Daniel Ellsberg leaked a classified
study known as the "Pentagon Papers" to the press. J. GROSSMAN & R. WELLS, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 1069 (2d ed. 1980). The publication of these docu-
ments led the United States to seek an injunction that would ban the New York Times from
continuing such disclosure. United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 326
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). The district court denied the Government's application for a preliminary
injunction. Id. at 331. On appeal, the Second Circuit remanded for findings of fact concern-
ing the Government's allegations of a threat to national security. United States v. New
York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544, 544 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (en banc), rev'd per curiam, 403
U.S. 713 (1971). The Supreme Court reversed the order of the court of appeals, holding that
the Government had not sustained the heavy burden required to justify prior restraints on
speech. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
Due to Ellsberg's role in the Pentagon Papers affair, Nixon admitted that he had re-
quested an official government investigation of Ellsberg. J. SIRcA, To SET THE RECORD
STRAIGHT 133-34 (1979). This investigation, however, went so far as to involve breaking into
the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding. Id. at 45. The Fielding break-in led
to the indictments of John D. Ehrlichman, Charles W. Colson, G. Gordon Liddy, Bernard L.
Barker, Eugenio Martinez and Felipe DeDiego. Barker and Martinez were two of the five
men apprehended at the scene of the Watergate break-in. 2 CHRONOLOGY, supra note 25, at
271. Due to these charges of governmental misconduct, the indictment of Ellsberg for espio-
nage, theft, and conspiracy concerning the Pentagon Papers leaks ended in a mistrial on
May 11, 1973. 1 CHRONOLOGY, supra note 13, at 46. At the Associated Press news conference,
Nixon declared that there had been no testimony that he had ever "specifically approved or
ordered the entrance into Dr. [sic] Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office." 2 CHRONOLOGY, supra
note 25, at 155.
In response to charges made by the press that Nixon had not paid a sufficient amount
in income taxes, Nixon commissioned a private audit of his personal finances, and an-
nounced that the results of the audit would be made available to the public. Id.
41 2 CHRONOLOGY, supra note 25, at 154-55.
42 Id. at 156. During the press conference, Nixon spoke of his visits to China and Mos-
cow as well as his efforts in the limitations of nuclear weapons. Id. According to Gallup,
Nixon's foreign policy achievements were always highly regarded, even during the Water-
gate crisis, "[b]ut if foreign affairs proved his forte, domestic problems were his ultimate
undoing." 111 GALLUP, supra note 9, Sept. 1974, at 4.
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ings showing only a slight improvement in November, 1973.4' This
was to be one of the last climbs in the opinion polls experienced by
Nixon during his administration.""
A few months later, in response to a congressional subpoena
issued on April 11, 1974, Nixon released transcripts of forty-six
tapes to the House Judiciary Committee.45 At the same time, a
compilation of over 1,000 pages of transcripts was made available
to the public.46 Despite considerable editing, the transcripts, rather
than exculpating the President, destroyed his credibility with the
American people.47 The same week that the transcripts were re-
leased, Nixon was served with a third-party subpoena for docu-
ments allegedly necessary for the criminal trial of former Attorney
General John N. Mitchell.48 Nixon entered a special appearance
and moved to quash the subpoena.49 On May 20, 1974, in a sum-
mary disposition of Nixon's assertions,5 0 including the claim of ex-
ecutive privilege, 51 Judge Sirica of the District of Columbia District
Court denied Nixon's motion.52 Pursuant to the granting of peti-
tions for writs of certiorari before judgment, the Supreme Court
set oral argument for July 8, 1974.2
43 103 GALLUP, supra note 9, at 1.
" See 111 GALLUP, supra note 9, Sept. 1974, at 7, 12.
2 CHRONOLOGY, supra note 25, at 327.
45 Id.
47 83 NEWSWEEu, May 13, 1974, at 17. Newsweek reported that even as edited, the tapes
"portrayed Mr. Nixon. . . as a weak, profane, cynical, isolated, inept and finally amoral
leader of men." Id. In April 1974, 46% of Americans found Nixon's actions serious enough
to warrant removal from office. 111 GALLUP, supra note 9, Sept. 1974, at 8.
48 See United States v. Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. 1326, 1328 (D.D.C. 1974), afl'd sub nom.
United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
"9 377 F. Supp. at 1328.
50 See id. at 1329-31. The Mitchell court determined that the mandate of the Special
Prosecutor overrode any claim as to the nonjusticiability of the issue as an intrabranch dis-
pute. Id. at 1329. After a finding that the subpoena met the requirements set forth in Rule
17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 377 F. Supp. at 1329-30, the court held
that the Special Prosecutor had made the prima facie showing required to rebut the execu-
tive privilege, id. at 1330.
81 377 F. Supp. at 1329; see Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 713-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per
curiam) (en banc).
52 377 F. Supp. at 1331.
'3 United States v. Nixon, 417 U.S. 960 (1974). Both Nixon and the Special Prosecutor
petitioned the Court for certiorari before judgment. The writs were granted due to the
"public importance of the issues presented and the need for their prompt resolution."
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 687 (1974).
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United States v. Nixon: UNANIMITY AT THE EXPENSE OF REASON
AND CLARITY
After resolving the three threshold issues of appealability,54
justiciability5 and prosecutorial compliance with the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure,56 the Supreme Court, in United
States v. Nixon, addressed the existence and applicability of
Nixon's claimed executive privilege.5 7 Noting the need for confi-
dentiality between the President and his advisers, as well as the
supremacy of each branch of government within its particular
sphere,58 the Court summarily recognized the existence of an exec-
utive privilege that is "fundamental to the operation of Govern-
ment and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers."5 9 Not-
withstanding the constitutional basis of the privilege, the Court
held that the privilege must yield to the countervailing constitu-
tional rights of compulsory process and due process of law.60 Con-
sequently, the Court ordered the President to produce the subpoe-
naed materials for in camera inspection by the trial judge."
While it is arguable that the Nixon Court reached the correct
decision on the merits by expediting the end of the Watergate cri-
sis, it has been recognized that the opinion is considerably lacking
in sound constitutional analysis. While some criticism has dealt
with the Court's determination of the threshold issues,6 2 most ad-
"' See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690 (1974). The Court recognized that an
order denying a motion to quash a subpoena generally is not directly appealable. Id. at 690-
91. Nevertheless, the Court determined that such an order was appealable in the Nixon case
since the "traditional contempt avenue" would be "inappropriate due to the unique setting
in which the question arises." Id. at 691.
81 See id. at 694-96. The Nixon Court rejected the argument that the case represented
a nonjusticiable intrabranch dispute. Noting that the Attorney General had delegated a por-
tion of his prosecutorial powers to the Special Prosecutor, id. at 694-96, the Court deter-
mined that the case presented the kind of question that "courts traditionally resolve," id. at
696-97. Thus, the article III "case or controversy" requirement was met. Id.
51 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 702. With respect to the third threshold
issue, the Court declined to upset the trial judge's determination that the Special Prosecutor
had complied with the requirements of Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure. 418 U.S. at 702. The Court observed that the Special Prosecutor had made a sufficient
showing of relevancy, admissibility and specificity in naming the subpoenaed materials to
justify their production prior to trial. Id. at 700, 702.
87 Id. at 705-06.
58 Id. at 705.
59 Id. at 708.
60 Id. at 709-13.
61 Id. at 714.
62 See, e.g., Kurland, United States v. Nixon: Who Killed Cock Robin?, 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 68, 70-73 (1974); Mishkin, Great Cases And Soft Law: A Comment On United States v.
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verse commentary has focused upon the Court's treatment of the
executive privilege questions. 3 First, the Nixon Court recognized
the existence of a constitutionally based executive privilege with-
out reference to available historical research on the subject.6 4 This
lack of historical examination is questionable, given that the issue
was one of first impression." Second, the opinion's overbroad lan-
Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 76, 80-82 (1974). Commenting upon the Court's disposition of
the threshold issues in the case, Professor Kurland noted that "the reasoning is interesting,
but it hardly marches to the conclusion, which may, nevertheless, be correct." Kurland,
supra, at 71. While fault has been found with the Court's reasoning, it has been noted that
the future application of the Nixon rationale as to these issues will probably be limited due
to the unique factual setting in which Nixon arose. See id.
63 See, e.g., Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4, 11
(1974) (questioning the Court's reasoning as no more than "ipse dixits'; Gunther, Judicial
Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 30, 35 (1974) (the argument for "absolute executive privilege deserved a
more focused, careful, separable answer than the Court's invocation of Marbury v.
Madison"); Owens, The Establishment of a Doctrine, Executive Privilege After United
States v. Nixon, 4 Tax. S.U.L. REv. 22, 39 (1976) (questioning the constitutional basis for a
finding of executive privilege). It has been argued that the Supreme Court implicitly created
an absolute privilege for national security purposes. Berger, supra, at 26; Henkin, Executive
Privilege: Mr. Nixon Loses But the Presidency Largely Prevails, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 40, 44-
45 (1974); Owens, supra, at 46; Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of
United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 116, 117-18 (1974).
In United States v. Nixon, the Court distinguished between a "broad, undifferentiated
claim of public interest in the confidentiality of. . .conversations" and "a claim of need to
protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets." 418 U.S. at 706. Judge
Wilkey, dissenting in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973), disputed such a distinc-
tion, noting that often the line drawn between these interests is unclear. Id. at 767 n.22
(citing Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question,
66 YALE L.J. 477, 487 (1957)).
4 418 U.S. at 711-12.
15 The chief executive's susceptibility to judicial process was addressed previously in
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d); see Constitutional
Law-Executive Privilege-The President Does Not Have an Absolute Privilege to With-
hold Evidence from a Grand Jury, 87 HARV. L. Rav. 1557, 1561-62 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Constitutional Law]. The Burr case involved the attempt to subject President Jefferson
to service of a subpoena directing the production of a letter in his possession alleged to be
necessary to the defendant Burr's trial on charges of treason. 25 F. Cas. at 30. In a second
case, also involving Burr, Chief Justice Marshall stated that although it was clear that a
President may be subpoenaed, United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)
(No. 14,694), "[in no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed against the
president as against an ordinary individual," id. at 192. The weak precedential value of the
Burr opinion has been noted. See Constitutional Law, supra, at 1562. Indeed, prior to the
Watergate litigation, the issue of executive privilege was one with "no controlling. . . prece-
dents." Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
The Constitution makes no explicit provision for executive privilege among the enumer-
ated powers of the executive. See U.S. CONST. art. II. Until 1974, many doubted whether
such a privilege could be implied from the doctrine of separation of powers. See Cox, Execu-
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guage presents a real danger with respect to its precedential ramifi-
cations."6 With veritably no discourse, the Nixon Court conclu-
sively pronounced, "[w]hatever the nature of the privilege of
confidentiality of Presidential communications in the exercise of
art. II powers, the privilege can be said to derive from the
supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitu-
tional duties." 7 While the privilege was circumscribed by the rec-
ognition that it must yield to the "fair administration of criminal
justice," 8 the nebulous boundaries of the privilege were blurred by
the Court's dictum that the privilege would be absolute if invoked
in the interests of "national security."6 " This language has led to
concerns that the Nixon decision, in the final analysis, strength-
ened rather than weakened the Presidency as an institution. In
addition, the possibility of the Nixon rationale being analogized to
well-established evidentiary privileges has been viewed as an un-
fortunate prospect. 1
tive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1383, 1383 (1974). The executive privilege has been re-
ferred to as a "constitutional myth" by Professor Berger, who has asserted that "pre-1789
history knows no such doctrine as executive privilege, and there is reason to believe that the
Framers did not mean to create it." Berger, Executive Privilege, Professor Rosenbaum, and
the Higher Criticism, 1975 DuKe L.J. 921, 922.
"See infra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
" 418 U.S. at 705. Executive privilege has been referred to as a concept that
"emerge[d] full blown from the head of the Court." Mishkin, supra note 62, at 84.
69 418 U.S. at 711-12. The Court's disposition of the executive privilege question is
characterized by a pattern of first exhibiting deference to the executive and then cutting
back on that deference. The Court initiated this pattern by recognizing a constitutional
privilege, id. at 706, yet later stating that the doctrine of separation of powers cannot justify
a privilege under all circumstances, id. at 706-07. The Court noted that "great respect" is to
be afforded to a claim made by the President, id. at 712, but held that a "generalized inter-
est in confidentiality" cannot be accorded such a "high degree of deference," id. at 711.
According to Professor Mishkin, this language represents a "[p]attern ... of... gratuitous
non-consequence-bearing declaration[s] favoring a position taken by the President, followed
by a somewhat off-the-mark rationale supporting a holding squarely against him . . "
Mishkin, supra note 62, at 83. In addition, Professor Ratner suggests that as a result of the
Court's reasoning, executive privilege will be upheld only when the evidence sought is "irrel-
evant or inadmissible," Ratner, Executive Privilege, Self Incrimination and the Separation
of Powers Illusion, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 92, 97-98 (1974), in which case "a constitutional
privilege is scarcely needed," id. at 98.
11 See 418 U.S. at 706, 707.
10 See, e.g., Owens, supra note 63, at 22 (executive privilege is "a weapon by which [the
Executive] can disrupt the system of checks and balances of the three branches of govern-
ment"); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 29 (United States v. Nixon dispelled the notion that
executive privilege is merely a "myth").
71 Henkin, supra note 63, at 44; Kurland, supra note 62, at 74; see infra notes 132-39
and accompanying text. It has been noted that the weighing process utilized by the Nixon
Court, if applied to existing evidentiary privileges, might result in their invalidation. Hen-
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The question that remains is why the Nixon opinion was so
poorly drafted. The answer apparently lies in the case's factual set-
ting, its rapid disposition, and the peculiar motive behind the
Nixon Court's unanimity.7 2 It has long been speculated that the
lack of debate and the use of overly broad language that is preva-
lent in Nixon can be attributed to the Court's perceived need to
render an unanimous or definitive judgment.73 There is little ques-
tion that the Court was cognizant of the American public's expec-
tation that the Court would end the Watergate crisis. The granting
of certiorari before judgment, the expedited appellate schedule,
and the extension of the Court's term indicated a desire to reach a
speedy decision.74 The desire for a unanimous opinion can be at-
tributed to the Court's need for a forceful stance to overcome the
inherent lack of an enforcement mechanism in the Judicial process
and perceived threats to its legitimacy. 5 Indeed, the possibility of
noncompliance by Nixon, touted by the media,7 6 was alluded to at
oral argument by the President's counsel.7" Anything less than a
unanimous judgment might have invited recalcitrance, and thus
further prolonged the Watergate crisis. The Court's perceived need
for unanimity does much to explain the broad language of the
Nixon opinion. While many Supreme Court opinions undoubtedly
kin, supra note 63, at 44.
72 See Van Alstyne, supra note 63, at 122. Professor Van Alstyne observed that "the
unanimity of the opinion was exceptional in light of the divisions which have so frequently
riven the Nixon/Warren Court." Id. (emphasis in original).
73 Mishkin, supra note 62, at 86-87. Nixon maintained that he would be willing to com-
ply only with a definitive statement from the Court on the relinquishment of tapes. Id.
While Nixon first asserted his intention to abide by such an answer from the Court, id., on
July 10, 1973, James D. St. Clair, Nixon's chief defense counsel, stated that "the President
was at least keeping open the option of defying the Court," N.Y. Times, July 10, 1974, § 1,
at 1, col. 6.
7' Kurland, supra note 62, at 69; Mishkin, supra note 62, at 76 (the Court felt "a re-
sponsibility to the nation").
7' Van Alstyne, supra note 63, at 122. The Court, possessing "neither the purse nor the
sword," has no enforcement mechanism and thus depends upon voluntary compliance with
its orders. A. Cox, supra note 31, at 7. The judicial branch's lack of an enforcement mecha-
nism to compel the executive branch to comply with a subpoena was noted by other courts
dealing with the Watergate litigation. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 712; In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 360 F. Supp. at 9. The judiciary's lack of an enforcement mechanism was suc-
cinctly described by Chief Justice Marshall when he stated that, "[ jludicial power, as con-
tradistinguished from the power of the laws, has no existence. Courts are the mere instru-
ments of the law, and can will nothing." Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738, 866 (1824).
76 See supra note 73.
7 Mishkin, supra note 62, at 87.
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are a product of compromise,7 8 a unanimous opinion is perhaps the
most difficult to draft since it may involve the incorporation of as
many as nine divergent viewpoints. Thus, although it may achieve
the goal of a clear statement from the Court concerning the case at
bar, a unanimous opinion may contain several vague, possibly in-
consistent statements. 9
It is certainly true that the Court's desire for unanimity, and
the compromise opinion that is likely to result, can be legitimate.
It is submitted, however, that this legitimacy hinges upon the goal
that unanimity ultimately seeks to further. If unanimity is merely
a reaction to an unpopular litigant, the costs of compromise appear
too high. When unanimity displays the Court's commitment to a
socially desirable policy goal, however, the breadth and vagueness
of the compromise opinion seems justified. A classic example of
this justifiable unanimity is exemplified by the segregation cases.80
In Brown v. Board of Education,"' the Court determined that the
fourteenth amendment mandated a finding that "separate but
equal" educational facilities were unconstitutional.8 2 The Court
78 W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 57 (1964); G. SCHUBERT, CONSTITU-
TIONAL POLITICS 125 (1960). The process of intra-Court negotiations enables the incorpora-
tion of as many ideas as possible and thereby serves to quell what might otherwise become a
dissent or concurrence. The difficulties in obtaining support of co-Justices is especially per-
vasive when unanimity is the chosen objective.
Any Justice may demand, as the price of his not writing separately, the inclusion
(or exclusion) in the single opinion of any language or ideas to which he assigns
sufficient importance. And so long as the ultimate outcome of the case is not af-
fected, the other Justices will be under strong pressure to acquiesce-leaving to
another day the problems (or disagreement) which they might have with that lan-
guage or idea.
Mishkin, supra note 62, at 87-88.
78 See G. SCHUBERT, supra note 78, at 123. Analyzing the Nixon opinion in light of the
Court's bargaining process, Professor Mishkin observed: "Having the Court speak with a
single voice necessarily became a primary objective.... The single opinion which did
emerge can be best understood at the outcome of a negotiation process in which each mem-
ber of the Court possesses extraordinary leverage for his individual views." Mishkin, supra
note 62, at 87.
o See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
81 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
82 See id. at 495. The "separate but equal" doctrine announced by the Court in Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), dictates that facilities separated on the basis of race were
not inherently unequal and violative of the fourteenth amendment as long as those provided
were substantially similar. See 163 U.S. at 548. The Brown Court specifically held that ra-
cially segregated schools were "inherently unequal," and that such segregation violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 495 (1954). In so holding, the Court expressly overruled any language of the Plessy
Court to the contrary. Id. at 494-95. The Brown Court recognized that the fashioning of a
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thereafter rendered a decree implementing the decision. 3 The
broad language of the unanimous Brown decree 4 may be attrib-
uted to the fact that the Court recognized the importance of re-
taining a united front on the segregation issue due to the radical
nature of the policy objective being furthered, and the uncertainty
of its acceptance by the community.5 5 It is submitted that the de-
sired end in the segregation cases-the implementation of a broad
policy goal-legitimized the vague nature of the Brown opinion,
whereas the desired end in the Nixon case-the short-term goal of
ending the Watergate scandal-did not justify the broad nature of
the Nixon opinion.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald: A LESS UNPOPULAR LITIGANT AND THE CLEAR
ExPOSITION OF VIEWPOINTS
The attitude of the American public toward Richard Nixon,
since 1977, has evolved from one of hostility to one of acceptance.86
remedy "present[ed] problems of considerable complexity," and therefore requested that
the parties present further argument on the matter. Id. at 495.
83 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter referred to as Brown
Decree].
84 See id. at 299-301. Rather than taking the radical step of ordering immediate racial
integration, the Court ordered "good faith implementation" of the 1954 decision "with all
deliberate speed." Id. at 299, 301. Although the Brown Decree required that school districts
make a "prompt and reasonable start" in desegregating the school systems, the possibility of
extending the time limits set by the district courts was expressly considered. Id. at 300.
Additionally, the Court was sensitive to school administration and transportation problems
caused by desegregation, and accordingly concluded that such problems were a proper con-
sideration for the district courts in evaluating the compliance of the school districts with the
good faith requirements of the Brown Decree. Id.
85 Note, The Brown Decisions And The Advisory Opinion, 45 Ky. L.J. 682, 688 (1957);
see Note, Segregation in Education, 34 B.U.L. REv. 463, 478 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Segregation in Education]. When black children began to attend previously all-white
schools, the results often were violent. Id. at 475-77. It has been noted that the issuance of
the Brown Decree represented a situation of "overwhelming public antagonism." Id. at 478.
Commenting upon the radical nature of the Brown Court's policy objective, Professor Schu-
bert noted that "[iut is doubtful whether either the President or the Congress, or both to-
gether, could have established the national policy of public school integration announced by
the Court in Brown v. Board of Education." G. SCHUBERT, supra note 78, at 459.
81 119 TIME, June 14, 1982, at 27. Since this resignation in 1974, Nixon has not re-
mained away from public scrutiny, maintaining his ties with foreign officials made during
his administration. N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1979, § 1, at 4, col. 3. Nixon's first postresignation
trip to China was in 1976. See id., Feb. 7, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 6. In 1978, Nixon received an
invitation from President Carter to attend a White House dinner honoring China's Deputy
Prime Minister, Teng Hsiao-ping. 93 NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 1979, at 48. In response to charges
of the impropriety of the invitation, President Carter noted that one of the achievements of
the Nixon administration was to open communications with the Chinese. Id. In 1980, Nixon
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This transmogrification has been attributed to both the passage of
time and the public disclosure of the abuses of other administra-
tions.8 Rather than continuing to condemn Nixon, there has been
a tendency to accentuate the positive aspects of his administration,
particularly his foreign policy achievements.8 8 By 1982, Nixon's
perceived expertise in foreign affairs qualified him to author a
guest editorial for the New York Times.8 9 It thus appears that in
1982, when Nixon v. Fitzgerald" was decided, the Supreme Court
was less susceptible to external pressure than its predecessor Court
in 1974. Indeed, an examination of the four opinions rendered in
Fitzgerald"1 reveals no trace of the external influence that per-
vades United States v. Nixon.92
In Fitzgerald, the plaintiff sought damages from former presi-
dent Nixon for plaintiff's termination as an Air Force employee.9
Fitzgerald alleged that his termination was a response to testifying
before a congressional committee as to cost overruns on Air Force
projects.9 4 Nixon contended that he was entitled to absolute immu-
traveled to Egypt to attend the funeral of the Shah of Iran. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1980, § 1,
at 11, col. 1. Nixon later accompanied former Presidents Carter and Ford to the funeral of
Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat in 1981. Id., Oct. 11, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 6. While in
Egypt, Nixon participated in discussions with Egypt's President-designate, Hosni Mubarak.
Id. at 20, col. 6.
87 119 TMmE, June 14, 1982, at 27.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
89 Nixon, 10 Years After the Visit to China, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1982, § 4, at 19, col.
1.
9o 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
91 The opinion of the Court, authored by Justice Powell, was joined by Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor. Chief Justice Burger filed a concur-
ring opinion. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun joined in a dissent authored by
Justice White. In addition, Justice Blackmun authored a dissent joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall.
1, See infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
93 102 S. Ct. 2697.
Id. at 2695. Fitzgerald formerly held the position of management analyst with the
Department of the Air Force. Id. at 2693. During the Johnson Presidency, Fitzgerald had
testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Com-
mittee of the United States Congress as to massive cost overruns of Air Force projects. He
alleged that his subsequent dismissal was in retaliation for this testimony. Id. at 2695. The
Civil Services Commission conducted hearings and concluded tha, while Fitzgerald's dis-
missal offended civil service regulations, there was no explicit evidence of retaliatory dismis-
sal. Id. at 2695-96. Following this decision, Fitzgerald filed suit against eight present and
former government officials, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, and "'one or More
[sic] . . white House Aides'." Id. at 2696; see Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688,
691 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd in part, 553 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The district court dismissed
the case on the ground of the statute of limitations. 384 F. Supp. at 692-98. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court decision except as to Butterfield, with respect to whom
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nity from civil suit since the claims arose from official acts of the
President.9 5 The district court rejected Nixon's claim of immu-
nity,96 and the court of appeals summarily dismissed his collateral
appeal.9 7 Nixon sought review of this dismissal, and the Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case in light of the "serious and unset-
tled" question of presidential immunity from civil suit.98
Noting the "unique position" of the President under the Con-
stitution,9 the Court granted the President absolute immunity
from civil suits arising from official acts.100 Central to the Court's
reasoning was the separate nature of the three branches of govern-
ment and judicial unwillingness to question the Executive's official
acts absent a compelling justification.0 1 The Court indicated, how-
ever, that when compelled to enter the sphere of a coordinate
branch of government, it would be doing so "not in derogation of
the separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance."'0 2
Adjudicating a "mer[e] private suit for damages" did not re-
present, in the Court's view, the extraordinary situation in which
judicial intrusion is mandated to preserve the balance of powers.10 3
The Court concluded that other available means of policing the
acts of the President, such as impeachment and constant exposure
the action was remanded. 553 F.2d at 231.
95 102 S. Ct. at 2697.
" Id.
1 Id.
98 Id. at 2698. A finding of a "serious and unsettled" question of law is necessary in
order to comply with the standards of the "collateral order" doctrine enunciated in Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Co., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), which dictates whether such an order is
immediately appealable, 337 U.S. at 547. The Fitzgerald Court determined that the issue
was within this category by virtue of the alleged "breach of essential Presidential preroga-
tives under the separation of powers." 102 S. Ct. 2698.
Il Id. at 2702.
100 Id. at 2705.
101 Id. at 2704.
102 Id. The Court indicated that the judiciary will only interfere "[w]hen judicial action
is needed to serve the broad public interests," such as those in issue in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
102 S. Ct. at 2704. In Youngstown, the Court interfered with the acts of the Executive after
determining that President Truman's order to seize steel mills amounted to a usurpation of
the powers of the legislature. 343 U.S. at 587-89. According to the Fitzgerald majority, the
judicial interference in Nixon was warranted to "vindicate the public interest." 102 S. Ct. at
2704. Justice White, in a dissenting opinion, reasoned that to subject the President to gen-
eral rules of law actually furthers the separation of powers since it allows Congress, through
a statutorily created cause of action, to place restraints on the President. Id. at 2724-25
(White, J., dissenting); see infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
103 102 S. Ct. at 2704.
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to the public via the media, would ensure that the Fitzgerald hold-
ing would not place the President above the law.10 4
Dissenting, Justice White rejected the notion that absolute im-
munity emanates from the Constitution.10 5 Rather than defining
the President's immunity by reference to his actions as President,
the dissent would apply a functional approach whereby the nature
of the President's actions would determine the scope of this immu-
nity.106 This qualified immunity would result in presidential liabil-
ity only if it were proven that the President knew or should have
known that his actions amounted to "an illegal and clear abuse of
his authority and power.' 10 7
In contrast to the Nixon opinion, which engendered much crit-
ical commentary for its ambiguity, 08 the opinions in Fitzgerald,
including a concurrence by Chief Justice Burger and a second dis-
sent by Justice Blackmun, render Fitzgerald a clear and complete
exposition of ideas. This is significant since the issues in Nixon
and Fitzgerald have much in common. While the Fitzgerald case
involved the issue of presidential immunity from civil suit rather
than executive privilege, both issues necessarily involve the separa-
tion of powers and thereby presented the Justices with similar con-
stitutional considerations. 09
It is the extensive debate on the separation of powers question
that clearly contrasts the approaches of the Nixon and Fitzgerald
Courts. Although no Justice dissented from the Nixon Court's
summary assertion that executive privilege is ground in the consti-
tutional doctrine of separation of powers," 0 the members of the
Fitzgerald Court were constrained to write separately given their
divergent views. The majority opinion in Fitzgerald is reminiscent
of the Nixon opinion in its assumption that absolute immunity for
the executive is "rooted in the constitutional tradition of the sepa-
104 Id. at 2706.
105 Id. at 2710 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White's dissent did not oppose absolute
immunity under all circumstances, id. at 2723 (White, J., dissenting), but did not elaborate
on what specific fact situations would require this immunity, id. (White, J., dissenting). The
dissent suggested that absolute immunity should only apply in those cases in which the
Executive's performance would be "substantially impaired by the jossibility of civil liabil-
ity." Id. (White, J., dissenting).
1'0 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 2719 (White, J., dissenting).
1*8 See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
1* 102 S. Ct. at 2702 n.31.
"0 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 716 (1974); supra text accompanying
notes 58-59.
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ration of powers."' Chief Justice Burger wrote separately for the
specific purpose of emphasizing that absolute immunity is man-
dated by the separation of powers.112 In contrast, reasoning that
"[n]o bright line can be drawn between arguments for absolute im-
munity based on the constitutional principle of separation of pow-
ers and arguments based on. . . 'public policy,' """ Justice White
maintained that there is little support in the doctrine of separation
of powers for an absolute immunity for the Chief Executive." 4 In-
deed, Justice White refers to the notion that subjecting the Presi-
dent to general rules of law is violative of the separation of powers
doctrine as "a frivolous contention passing as legal argument."'1 15
Echoing Justice White's sentiments, Justice Blackmun found no
support for the notion that the President's imnunity is compelled
by separation of powers concerns."',
The intensity of debate, prevalent in Fitzgerald but clearly
lacking in Nixon, despite the similarity of the issues presented,
supports the contention that debate was subordinated to a per-
ceived need for unanimity in 1974. This conclusion seems espe-
cially compelling since six of the Fitzgerald Justices also took part
in Nixon, and although they found a common ground to agree
upon in 1974, the views they advocated in 1982 were quite di-
verse."17 Broad enough to accommodate these divergent view-
points, the 1974 opinion was cited with equal force by both the
Fitzgerald majority opinion and Justice White's dissent. The ma-
jority focused upon that aspect of the Nixon opinion that estab-
lished executive privilege,1 8 while Justice White cited Nixon for
I See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2701 (1982). Recognizing that the office of
the Presidency did not exist throughout most of the development of the common law, the
Fitzgerald Court considered absolute presidential immunity to be "a functionally mandated
incident of the President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separa-
tion of powers and supported by... history." Id.
112 Id. at 2706 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
"I Id. at 2717 (White, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 2725 (White, J., dissenting).
115 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 2726-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
17 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun and Powel
participated in both the Nixon and Fitzgerald decisions. Although Justice Rehnquist was a
member of the Court in 1974, he took no part in the Nixon decision. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at
685.
"a See 102 S. Ct. at 2704. The Fitzgerald majority referred to Nixon as representing
one of the rare situations when judicial intrusion into the functions of the executive branch
is warranted. Id.; see supra note 102.
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the proposition that even the President is not above the law."' In
sum, the discourse in Fitzgerald appears to be everything that
Nixon should have been. Although concededly speculative, it
seems that in the absence of the Court's susceptibility to the pres-
sures engendered by anti-Nixon sentiment in 1974, the opinion in
United States v. Nixon might have displayed the thorough analy-
sis and vigorous debate that is patent in Nixon v. Fitzgerald. In-
stead, there exists an opinion of forced unanimity, characterized by
a paucity of debate and blurring of judicial viewpoints, with little
value in guiding the lower courts and of questionable precedential
utility.
THE PRECEDENTIAL IMPACT OF United States v. Nixon
The result of the compromise of the Nixon Justices 20 was a
broadly worded opinion that recognized a constitutionally based
privilege in one breath and overrode it in the next based upon the
needs of the criminal justice system.' 2' The Nixon holding states
that this qualification of the privilege is mandated by the overrid-
ing constitutional considerations of the fifth and sixth amend-
ments, and thereby intimates that any claim of privilege must
yield to the needs of the criminal defendant.122 While such an ap-
19 102 S. Ct. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent interpreted Nixon as estab-
lishing that the legality of the President's actions are subject to judicial determination. Id.
(White, J., dissenting).
In addition, Chief Justice Burger's Fitzgerald concurrence took issue with Justice
White's interpretation of the words "judicial process" as they are used in Nixon. See 102 S.
Ct. at 2707 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice White quoted from the Nixon opinion:
"[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the confidentiality. . . without more,
can sustain an absolute, unqualified presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process
under all circumstances." Id. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at
706). According to Justice White, this passage helped to establish that subjecting the Presi-
dent to civil suits for damages was not violative of the doctrine of separation of powers. 102
S.Ct. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger chose to afford the passage a
narrower interpretation, concluding that Nixon merely established that the President is re-
quired to produce relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 2707 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
120 See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
"2 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974). The Court, while noting
that the President's privilege of confidentiality is "constitutionally based," noted that the
right to "production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimen-
sions." Id. at 711; see supra note 68.
122 418 U.S. at 711-12. The Nixon Court, without referring to the nature of the evidence
requested, simply stated: "In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privi-
lege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the President's re-
sponsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal
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plication of the rights of the criminal defendant is no doubt wel-
comed by many commentators, 123 it is doubtful whether such a
reading of Nixon is mandated in light of the more limited applica-
tion the Court has given such rights in the more recent Supreme
Court cases.1"4
The Court's treatment of the sixth amendment right to com-
pulsory process demonstrates this point.125 Although the Court had
given virtually no attention to this right prior to 1967,126 the past
15 years have witnessed much construction of this sixth amend-
ment guarantee. 127 The common thread running through these
cases is that a criminal defendant's right to obtain evidence is not
absolute.1 28 The Court has stressed the importance of a prelimi-
justice." Id.
123 See, e.g., Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 73, 161 (1974)
("[n]o interest protected by a privilege is sufficiently important to outweigh the defendant's
right to establish his innocence"); Note, Separation of Powers and Defense Witness Immu-
nity, 66 GEo. L.J. 51, 82 (1977) (advocating judicial review of prosecutor's decision not to
grant immunity to defense witnesses). The argument that the prosecution be required to
grant immunity to witnesses upon a defendant's request has been overwhelmingly rejected
by the circuit courts of appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Heffington, 682 F.2d 1075, 1081
(5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 778 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1077 (1981); Myers v. Frye, 401 F.2d 18, 20-21 (7th Cir. 1968). But see Government of
the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 969 (3d Cir. 1980).
"' See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
25 See infra note 127.
M Westen, Compulsory Process 11, 74 MICH. L. REv. 191, 194-95 (1975). According to
Professor Westen, in the 170 years prior to the Court's hearing of Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14 (1967), in which the Court held that the defendant was denied his right to compul-
sory process, 388 U.S. at 23, the Court mentioned the compulsory process "clause only five
times, twice in dictum and three times" in explaining its reluctance to construe it. Westen,
supra, at 194-95 (footnote omitted).
'27 See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 3450 (1982) (defen-
dant's due process and compulsory process rights not violated when government deported
witnesses without giving the defendant an opportunity to interview them); Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) (state court order limiting the right of defendant to impeach wit-
ness violated sixth amendment right to confrontation at trial); Cool v. United States, 409
U.S. 100, 104 (1972) (per curiam) (trial judge's instruction that testimony of an accomplice
must be believed beyond a reasonable doubt before being considered by jury deprived de-
fendant of his sixth amendment right to present evidence).
28 See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 3446 (1982). The fifth
and sixth amendment rights of a criminal defendant to obtain evidence are coextensive. See
supra note 127. Accordingly, recent Supreme Court pronouncements in the context of due
process, like those in the sixth amendment setting, demonstrate that the criminal defen-
dant's right to obtain evidence is not absolute. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
108-09 (1976).
Professor Westen has noted that the right of the accused to present a defense through
witnesses emanates from the sixth amendment as well as the due process clause of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. Westen, supra note 123, at 120. While due process requires
19831
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:750
nary showing by the defendant of the materiality and relevance of
the requested evidence. 129 That the sixth amendment is not an ab-
that the procedures relating to a criminal defendant comport with the general standard of
fundamental fairness, see Gaines v. Hess, 662 F.2d 1364, 1368 (10th Cir. 1981); Westen,
supra note 123, at 121, the mandates of the sixth amendment are more specific in their
requirements. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment rights of the defendant that are relevant to
the production of evidence in a criminal proceeding are those which emanate from the con-
frontation and compulsory process clauses. Westen, supra note 123, at 182. The confronta-
tion clause imposes upon the prosecution the requirement to make witnesses available for
cross-examination by the defendant. Id. The compulsory process clause allows the defen-
dant to avail himself of the court's process in obtaining evidence in his favor. Id.
Although the Court initially based its decisions granting rights to the criminal defen-
dants on due process grounds, see, e.g., Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 n.9 (1964); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948), it is currently recognized that the rights of the criminal
defendant, as developed under the due process clause, would be substantially the same if
decided under the sixth amendment. See Westen, supra note 123, at 129; see also Westen,
supra note 126, at 221. It is doubtful, therefore, whether a different outcome would result if
the defendant based his claim upon either the sixth amendment or the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. Westen, supra note 123, at 127. The Court has recognized the rela-
tionship between the two amendments in noting that they have "borrowed much of [the]
reasoning with respect to the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment from
cases involving the Due Process Clause . . . ." United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 102 S.
Ct. 3440, 3449 (1982).
In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), the Court, while recognizing the "'es-
sential and fundamental'" requirement of a fair trial, was careful to note that "the right to
confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accom-
modate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." Id. at 295. In construing the
case of Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), wherein the Court held that the Gov-
ernment's invocation of the "informer's privilege" deprived the defendant of an opportunity
to prepare a defense by preventing the disclosure of the identity of an undercover employee,
id. at 64-65, the Supreme Court observed: "[w]hat Roviaro . . . makes clear is that this
Court was unwilling to impose any absolute rule requiring disclosure of an informer's iden-
tity .... " McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967); see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74, 80 (1970) (plurality opinion) (limiting the right of confrontation by exceptions to the
hearsay rule does not necessarily amount to constitutional violation). Although the right to
compulsory process rarely has been construed, see supra note 126, one court noted its limi-
tations in the celebrated case of United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,692d). In Burr, Chief Justice Marshall commented that if the subpoenaed material con-
tained any matter of "which [it] would be imprudent to disclose, . . . such matter . .
[would] of course be suppressed." Id. at 37.
129 See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 3446-47 (1982). The Court
recently has reaffirmed the notion that a violation of constitutional rights cannot be estab-
lished by a mere showing of a deprivation of testimony. See id. at 3446 . A defendant is
required to show that he has been deprived of testimony that would have been relevant and
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solute right suggests that a claim of privilege will not, in all cases,
yield to a sixth amendment challenge.1 30 By limiting the decisions
it has rendered in this area, the Court has recognized the need for
ad hoc determinations when a criminal defendant claims a depri-
vation of sixth amendment rights.131 It is submitted that these
claims should not be assessed through such broad generalizations
as those contained in the Nixon opinion. The broad language of
the Nixon opinion, it is suggested, fosters the abandonment of a
prudent and thoughtful case-by-case adjudication in favor of a bal-
ancing that arguably gives a broader reading to the sixth amend-
ment than that generally mandated by the Court.
Seizing upon the broad language in Nixon to resolve the con-
flict between privileges and a criminal defendant's constitutional
claims, state courts have referred to Nixon as both "compelling"13 2
and "dispositive"1 33 precedent. Consequently, in some instances,
in-depth considerations of the competing policy concerns have
been sacrificed. Rather than focusing upon the facts presented,
courts have analogized cases before them to the factual setting
presented in Nixon. 1 4 This reasoning almost inevitably results in
the denial of a claim of privilege. 135 Once it is recognized that in
Nixon a constitutionally based privilege was required to yield to
material to the outcome of the trial. Westen, supra note 123, at 221. The concept of rele-
vance refers to the tendency of evidence to prove a fact, while that of materiality refers to
the relationship between the fact that the evidence tends to prove and the issue in the case.
See MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185, at 434-35 (2d ed. 1972). Addi-
tionally, a defendant is required to make a formal request to the government to exercise its
powers. Westen, supra note 123, at 221.
130 Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process
Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 STAN. L. REv. 935, 953 (1978); cf.
United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (qualified newsman's privi-
lege upheld in criminal case), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
131 See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 303 (1973). The Chambers Court specifi-
cally limited its holding to the facts of the case. Id. The Court's holding in Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), also was limited to the facts of the case. See id. at 23.
,32 State v. Roma, 140 N.J. Super. 582, 591, 357 A.2d 45, 50 (Law Div. 1976).
133 People ex rel. l. Judicial Inquiry Bd. v. Hartel, 72 Ill. 2d 225, 237, 380 N.E.2d 801,
807 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979).
23 See, e.g., State v. Roma, 140 N.J. Super. 582, 591-92, 357 A.2d 45, 50-51 (Law Div.
1976); State v. Singleton, 137 N.J. Super. 436, 441, 349 A.2d 139, 141-42 (Law Div. 1975),
afl'd, 158 N.J. Super. 517, 386 A.2d 880 (App. Div. 1978); In re Pittsburgh Action Against
Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 27, 428 A.2d 126, 131 (1981); infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
235 See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text. But see People v. Khan, 80 Mich.
App. 605, 611-22, 264 N.W.2d 360, 363-68 (1978) (conflict between rape shield statute ex-
cluding evidence of past sexual conduct and defendant's sixth amendment rights does not
require a simple balancing of interests in all factual settings).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the needs of the "fair administration of criminal justice, '136 it is
not difficult to reason that any statutory or common-law privilege
must likewise yield in any criminal setting. This reasoning seems
particularly troublesome given the wide range of privileges that
have been subject to challenge.
For example, in determining the applicability of a statutory
marriage counselor's privilege, the New Jersey Superior Court, af-
ter quoting at length from Nixon, reduced the conflict between the
privilege and the request for information to a simple balancing test
by comparing the case at bar to Nixon. The court concluded, "Do
the policy considerations which support the statutory privilege ac-
corded marriage counselors transcend the constitutional guaran-
tees. . . afforded to a defendant in a criminal action? This court
thinks not.'1 3 7 Similarly, when faced with an apparent conflict be-
tween a statutory privilege protecting the confidentiality of parole
records and the request of the prosecution, the same court, relying
almost entirely on Nixon, summarily concluded that the claim of
privilege must yield. 38 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined
the opportunity to recognize a common-law privilege protecting
the confidentiality of the files of a rape crisis center, noting, "[n]o
less than in Nixon, where a president's claim of absolute privilege
was rejected in favor of the Government's effort to obtain evidence,
we must reject appellant's claim of absolute privilege."' 9 To be
M United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974); see supra notes 59-68 and ac-
companying text.
'37 State v. Roma, 140 N.J. Super. 582, 592, 357 A.2d 45, 50-51 (Law Div. 1976). In
Roma, both the prosecution and the defense sought to compel the testimony and records of
the criminal defendant's marriage counselor. Id. at 584, 357 A.2d at 46. In response, the
marriage counselor invoked a State statute providing for the confidentiality of communica-
tions between the counselor and his client. Id. at 585, 357 A.2d at 46-47. In concluding that
the privilege was required to yield, id. at 593, 357 A.2d at 51, the Roma court referred to
Nixon as "perhaps the most compelling case in which the Supreme Court had occasion to
weigh the competing interests of enforcing a privilege as against ... the fair administration
of criminal justice," id. at 591, 357 A.2d at 50.
"' See State v. Singleton, 137 N.J. Super 436, 439-41, 349 A.2d 139, 141-42 (Law Div.
1975), afl'd, 158 N.J. Super. 517, 386 A.2d 880 (App. Div. 1978). In Singleton, the prosecu-
tion issued a subpoena duces tecum to the New Jersey State Parole Board requesting the
transcripts of the defendant's parole revocation hearing. Notwithstanding that the confiden-
tiality of the requested evidence was ensured by statute, the court ordered production of the
records. 137 N.J. Super. at 439-41, 349 A.2d at 141-42. The Singleton court referred to
Nixon as announcing a balancing test that simply requires that "the general privilege of
confidentiality [be] weighed against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administra-
tion of criminal justice." Id. at 440, 349 A.2d at 142 (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711).
"1 In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 27, 428 A.2d 126, 131 (1981). In
Pittsburgh, the director of a rape crisis center refused to comply with a court order author-
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sure, the state's interest in furthering the policies underlying such
privileges often directly clashes with a defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights. It is indeed unfortunate that in the search by state
courts' for precedent and guidance, the broad language of Nixon
has proven to be an irresistable talisman.
It is suggested that a resolution of the conflict between eviden-
tiary privileges and constitutional rights requires an approach
more enlightened than simple reliance upon Nixon. Central to this
resolution is an analysis of the underlying purpose of the privilege
at issue.140 After identifying this purpose, a balancing of the needs
of the party seeking the evidence against the importance of the
objective to be furthered by the privilege is necessary. This balanc-
ing should entail consideration of several factors that will vary de-
pending upon the factual setting presented. First, the court should
consider whether it is the prosecution or the defense that is seek-
ing the privileged material. Constitutional guarantees are expressly
granted to the criminal defendant.14 1 Thus, it is argued, the claim
of a prosecutor to override the privilege appears less compelling
than that of the defense.142 The reviewing court should also con-
izing inspection of the center's files by a criminal defendant charged with rape, urging that
the court recognize a common-law privilege for documents generated as a result of commu-
nications between victims of rape and center personnel. Id. at 23-24, 428 A.2d at 130. After
a consented-to in camera viewing of the relevant documents, the trial judge determined, as a
matter of fact, that the documents would not be useful to the defendant as a cross-examina-
tion tool. The court nonetheless ordered the evidence made available to counsel for the
accused. Id. at 23, 428 A.2d at 129. In denying the claim of privilege, the court stated, "We
are guided, too, by the 'executive privilege' case of United States v. Nixon. . . where the
Supreme Court of the United States unanimously refused to permit the. . . 'generalized
interest in confidentiality'. . . to prevail over 'fundamental demands of due process of law
in the fair administration of criminal justice.'" Id. at 26, 428 A.2d at 131 (quoting Nixon,
418 U.S. at 711).
1 0 See, e.g., Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 396, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608,
612 (1979) (purpose of newsman's statutory privilege is to facilitate the gathering of news
that might not otherwise be available for public dissemination); People ex rel. Ill. Judicial
Inquiry Bd. v. Hartel, 72 Ill. 2d 225, 229-30, 380 N.E.2d 801, 803 (1978) (confidentiality
provision of state constitution protecting documents of the judicial disciplinary body exists
to protect judges from adverse publicity and to protect and encourage testifying witnesses),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979); State v. Roma, 140 N.J. Super. 582, 586, 357 A.2d 45, 47
(Law Div. 1976) (marriage counselor privilege exists to encourage parties to seek profes-
sional aid without fear of disclosure).
41 In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 273, 394 A.2d 330, 337, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978);
see U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
'142 See Farber, 78 N.J. at 273, 394 A.2d at 337. The case of State v. Roma, 140 N.J.
Super. 582, 357 A.2d 45 (Law Div. 1976), suggests that when both a criminal defendant and
the prosecution seek the privileged material, a denial of privilege is more likely. Id. at 587,
357 A.2d at 46. But see State v. Singleton, 137 N.J. Super. 436, 437, 349 A.2d 139, 140 (Law
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sider whether the privileged material is in the possession of the
requesting party's adversary. While the prosecution's possession of
exculpatory evidence is likely to amount to a constitutional viola-
tion,1 43 the nonavailability of privileged material to both the prose-
cution and the defense militates in favor of upholding the claim of
privilege. 44 In addition, the court should take into account
whether the privilege has been waived. It is suggested that waiver
by the party for whose benefit the privilege is primarily created
militates in favor of overriding the privilege claims.145 Finally, the
court may take into account the nature of the crime involved. The
possibility of deprivation of life or liberty may mandate that a
claim of privilege be denied, whereas the criminal accusations of a
lesser nature may be adequately defended without intruding upon
privileged relationships.1 46 It is submitted that an analysis consid-
Div. 1975) (when challenged subpoena is issued by the prosecution, constitutional argument
is undercut), af'd, 158 N.J. Super. 517, 386 A.2d 880 (App. Div. 1978). Interestingly, in
Nixon, the allegedly privileged information was sought, not by the defendant, but by the
Special Prosecutor. See 418 U.S. at 687-88. Thus, it has been noted that the Nixon Court's
decision was not compelled by the mandates of the sixth amendment. See Farber, 78 N.J. at
273, 394 A.2d at 337. It is suggested that affording the prosecution and defense concomitant
constitutional guarantees places an unwarranted judicial gloss on the meaning of the sixth
amendment.
143 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Brady, the Court held that even
good-faith suppression of requested exculpatory evidence by the prosecution could amount
to a due process violation. Id.
"' See In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 62, 428 A.2d 126, 150 (1981)
(Larsen, J., dissenting). In Pittsburgh, Judge Larsen noted that the withholding of evidence
from only the defense amounts to "'gamesmanship' which should not play a part in the
outcome of a prosecution." Id. (Larsen, J., dissenting).
145 Cf. People ex rel. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd. v. Hartell, 72 Ill. 2d 225, 240, 380 N.E.2d
801, 808 (1978) (Clark, J., concurring) (constitutional privilege protecting confidentiality of
records of judicial disciplinary proceedings; waiver of privilege by judge rendered an uphold-
ing of privilege unnecessary), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979). While the Illinois Judicial
Inquiry Board majority agreed that the privilege protecting confidentiality of judicial
records served to protect the judge, id. at 229, 380 N.E.2d at 803, protection and encourage-
ment of testifying witnesses were also cited as justifying the privilege, id. Thus, the majority
found the defendant judge's waiver argument unpersuasive. Given that protection of judges
was cited specifically in the privilege's legislative history, id., it is suggested that protection
of the charged judge from adverse publicity was the privilege's primary purpose. Thus, the
waiver of the privilege by the charged judge becomes significant to the court's
determination.
In State v. Roma, 140 N.J. Super. 582, 357 A.2d 45 (Law Div. 1976), the marriage coun-
selor privilege was waived by the defendant client. Id. at 585, 357 A.2d at 47. Although the
waiver argument was raised by both the state and the defense counsel, id. at 585-86, 357
A.2d at 47, the Roma court found their reasoning unpersuasive, setting forth the constitu-
tional argument sua sponte. Id. at 587, 357 A.2d at 48.
16 Cf. People v. Schmidt, 56 Il. 2d 572, 574-75, 309 N.E.2d 557, 558 (1974) (restricting
application of broad statutory criminal discovery rules to cases in which a penitentiary sen-
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erate of these factors is preferable to the mere incantation of
Nixon's overbroad language. Use of the more simplistic approach
has resulted in the potential for inequity as well as a contraction of
state-created privilege beyond the degree apparently mandated by
the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
Ostensibly, the Supreme Court opinion in United States v.
Nixon was influenced by public sentiment and external pressure.
The Court's apparent reaction to this pressure was the presenta-
tion of a united front, possible only through the juxtaposition of
diverse viewpoints in a single opinion. This seems especially true
after viewing the Fitzgerald Court's treatment of the civil immu-
nity issue. Unfortunately, the broad language of the Nixon opinion
has been utilized by state courts to solve a particularly delicate
question of constitutional law in what is arguably an overly sim-
plistic manner. Although most often the influence of external
forces on the Court will be impossible to detect, it is clear that in
United States v. Nixon, in which unanimity preceded reasoned de-
bate, external influence and hence nonobjectivity was accorded its
day in court.
Anne Y. Shields
tence is possible).
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